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United States Supreme Court 
Surveys:  2015 Term 
Franchise Tax Board of California v. 
Hyatt: A Split Court, Full Faith and 
Credit, and Federal Common Law 
Jonathan M. Gutoff 
On first glance, a case involving a longstanding state tax 
dispute is probably not one to excite much interest for a general 
audience.  And indeed, Franchise Tax Board of California v. 
Hyatt1 did not attract much attention in the general news media. 
Nonetheless, the case contains, if not something for everyone, a lot 
more than tax issues.  The case involves issues of state sovereign 
immunity, the consequence of the death of Justice Scalia and an 
evenly split Supreme Court, and relations among the States, and, 
properly understood, the law making power of the Supreme Court. 
I. THE CASE
The case saw the second trip of Gilbert P. Hyatt to the 
Supreme Court as a respondent on a grant of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Nevada,2 though his second time there 
undoubtedly left him less satisfied than his first.3  Sometime in 
 Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
1. (Hyatt II), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016).
2. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt I), 538 U.S. 488, 490
(2003). 
3. California statutes provide complete immunity from suit to its tax
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the early 1990’s, Hyatt moved from California to Nevada.  While 
Hyatt claimed he moved in September of 1991,4 after 
performing an investigation and audit the Franchise Tax Board 
determined that he had only left California in April of 1992, and, 
as a result, Hyatt owed California over $10,000,000 in taxes, 
interest, and penalties.5  It was not the determination of owed 
taxes, however, that brought Hyatt’s dispute with California to 
the United States Supreme Court, but the process of the 
investigation and audit.6 
 Hyatt claimed that the Franchise Tax Board’s 
investigation, much of which occurred in Nevada, was 
tortious and sued in Nevada state court.7  As I will discuss 
further below, in a 1979 case, Nevada v. Hall, the Court held 
that states are not immune from suits in the courts of other 
states.8  Nonetheless, as a result of the Eleventh Amendment9 
and a series of decisions from the late 1990’s and the first 
decade of this century, save for actions granted by Congress to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment10 and the Bankruptcy 
Clause,11 states have a constitutional immunity from suits by 
private parties in the federal courts,12 federal administrative 
agencies,13 and in their own courts.14  In the first trip of the 
Franchise Tax Board and Hyatt to the Supreme 
agency for torts committed by its employees, but Nevada does not allow its 
own agencies to be immune from suit for intentional torts of its employees.  
The United States Supreme Court held that the Nevada courts did not have 
to give full faith and credit to California’s laws, and thus did not have to 
substitute California law for its own laws, because Hyatt’s Nevada residence, 
and the fact that the tortious conduct at issue occurred in Nevada, 
established significant contacts such that Nevada’s interest in the matter did 
not make it unfair to apply Nevada law. Id. at 493–95. 
4. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1279.
5. Id. at 1279–80.
6. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. at 488.
7. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280.
8. 440 U.S. 410, 410 (1979).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress “the power to enforce
by appropriate legislation the provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment); see 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
11. U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress to enact “uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”); see 
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 375, 377 (2006). 
12. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
13. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760
(2002). 
14. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745 (1999).
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Court,15 California claimed that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause16 required that Nevada apply the statutory immunity 
granted by California to its officers and agencies in Nevada state 
court.17  The Supreme Court of Nevada rejected California’s 
argument, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.18  
According to the Court, so long as one state’s statutes did not 
display “‘a policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister [s]tate,” 
a state was free to apply its own laws to suits against other states 
in its own courts.19 
On remand, a Nevada jury awarded Hyatt nearly 
$500,000,000 in compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
fees.20  The Nevada Supreme Court reduced the award to 
$1,000,000, but upheld the finding of liability and remanded for 
consideration of damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.21  The California Franchise Tax Board petitioned for 
certiorari, arguing that California should be immune as result of 
Nevada’s adoption of the discretionary-function exception to 
sovereign immunity found in the Federal Tort Claims Act; that 
Nevada v. Hall should be overruled; and argued that, even if it 
were amenable to suit in Nevada courts, Nevada was obligated to 
provide California agencies the same level of immunity—a 
damage cap of $50,000—as it provided to its own.22  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the second and third questions.23  The 
Court split evenly on whether to overrule Hall, and affirmed 
without opinion.24  As to California’s immunity, the Court agreed 
with California, but not without dissent, and reversed and 
remanded for Nevada courts to give California’s Franchise Tax 
Board the same immunity.25 
In light of the death of Justice Scalia in February of 201626 
 
 15. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 16. U.S. CONST.  art. IV, § 1. 
 17. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. at 491–92. 
 18. Id. at 493–94. 
 19. See id. at 499 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)). 
 20. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280 (2016). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2015) 
(No. 14–1175). 
 23. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v Hyatt, 135 S. Ct. 2940, 2940 (2015). 
 24. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1279. 
 25. See id. at 1283. 
 26. See, e.g., Adam Litpak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, 
Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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the even split on the Court was hardly surprising; however, it 
reveals something not only about the dynamics of an evenly split 
Court, but also about the current state of sovereign immunity 
doctrine.  The ruling on the extent to which Nevada had to treat 
the California Franchise Tax Board as it would a Nevada agency 
may not be of widespread importance, but it is the way in which 
the discussion was framed that is instructive on the Court’s 
attitude toward federal common law.  I will briefly consider both 
aspects of the case. 
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF A STATE 
A. In Federal Court and Its Own Courts 
1. What Does Article III Say? 
The second section of Article III of the Constitution lays out 
the limits of jurisdiction of the United States courts.  One of the 
nine heads of jurisdiction, the types of cases and controversies to 
which the federal judicial power extends, is “[c]ontroversies . . . 
between a [s]tate and a Citizen of another [s]tate.”27  In the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress exercised that power by giving the 
Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts, then the federal trial 
courts for diversity cases, concurrent jurisdiction over those 
suits.28  In Chisolm v. Georgia the Supreme Court considered a 
case brought by a creditor of Georgia to collect a debt as an 
original action in the Supreme Court.29  Claiming that a state, as 
a sovereign, could not be sued without its consent, Georgia refused 
to appear.30  By a vote of four to one, the Court disagreed.31  The 
majority of the Court reasoned that Article III section 2 had 
removed the States’ sovereign immunity in federal court.32 
2. What Does the Eleventh Amendment Say? 
About two years after Chisolm, the States ratified the 
 
2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 28. An Act to Establish Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, sec. 
11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). 
 29. 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793). 
 30. Id. at 469.  
 31. Id. at 476.  
 32. There is no opinion of the Court. The justices issued their opinions 
seriatim.  
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Eleventh Amendment, which provides, “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”33  The language of the Eleventh Amendment 
appears to strip federal courts of the power to hear diversity 
actions where a state is a defendant, or, perhaps, any action, 
whatever its basis, where a state is a defendant in a suit brought 
by a citizen of a different state.  In Hans v. Louisiana, however, 
the Court announced that the extent of state sovereign immunity 
was not limited to the text of the Eleventh Amendment.34 
3.  The Nature of Constitutional Sovereign Immunity Outside the 
Eleventh Amendment 
In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana brought an action against the 
State to recover for the State’s default on its bonds.35  Hans 
brought his action in federal trial court pursuant to the fairly 
recent grant of federal question jurisdiction to the federal trial 
courts,36 and the Constitution’s prohibition against states 
impairing contracts.37  Because the case involved a state being 
sued by one of its own citizens, the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment did not prohibit Hans’ action.  However, the Supreme 
Court decided that underlying the Eleventh Amendment is a form 
of state sovereign immunity, which was not abrogated by Article 
III, and which Congress did not abrogate by granting federal 
question jurisdiction.38  After Hans, the question remained 
whether Congress, pursuant to any of the powers the Constitution 
grants, could enact a law that would abrogate sovereign 
immunity. 
In 1989, a fractured Court upheld the assertion of jurisdiction 
under an act of Congress39 in Union Gas v. Pennsylvania.40  
Writing for three other members of the Court, Justice Brennan 
concluded that state sovereign immunity was simply a creature of 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 34. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
 35. Id. at 1.  
 36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 38. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
 39. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.  
99–499, § 113, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
 40. 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
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federal common law, which Congress could abrogate pursuant to 
any of its powers.41  Justice Scalia, also writing for three other 
members of the Court, disagreed,42 and Justice White joined the 
in the result of affirming jurisdiction over Pennsylvania, but wrote 
separately to explain that he would not have found the 
Congressional intent in the statute clear enough to abrogate state 
immunity.43  Whatever confusion caused by the fractured Court in 
Union Gas would last less than a decade. 
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,44 an action brought 
by the Tribe against Florida for Florida’s alleged failure to 
negotiate with the Tribe over the establishment of casinos as 
required by the Indian Gaming Act,45 the Court overruled Union 
Gas.  By a vote of five to four, it held that the state sovereign 
immunity set out in Hans was of constitutional dimension, and 
Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause46 to abrogate 
that immunity in federal court.47  Following Seminole Tribe, in 
Alden v. Maine,48 the Court considered a case brought by a state 
employee in state court for alleged violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.49  Again, by a five to four vote, the Court 
concluded that, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress had 
no power to force states to answer for federal suits in their own 
courts.50  And this is where the matter stands today. The Eleventh 
Amendment gives states immunity from suits in federal court, and 
states cannot be sued in their own courts without their consent.51  
This leaves the question of what happens when a state is sued in 
the court of another state. 
 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring). 
 44. 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). 
 45. See 25 U.S.C.A § 2710(d)(3)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244). 
 46. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (focused on Congress’ power under the 
Indian Commerce Clause, but the Court’s holding applies equally to 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate and international commerce). 
 47. Id. at 64. 
 48. 527 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1999). 
 49. 29 U.S.C.A §§ 201–219 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 50. Alden, 527 U.S. at 732–33. 
 51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, 64. 
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B. Actions Against States in the Courts of Other States 
1. Rarity of States as Private Defendants 
The Constitution does contemplate states being sued by other 
states, but such actions are part of the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction.52  The question as to what should happen when a 
private plaintiff sues a state in the courts of the plaintiff’s state 
has not called for a lot of resolution.  Prior to the expansion of 
personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 
Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement53 a party 
would only be subject to a state’s jurisdiction where the party was 
present in the state, where the party had property in the state, or 
where the defendant consented to suit.54  It is not very often that 
a defendant state would have found itself in this predicament. 
2. The Court Allows States to be Sued in the Courts of Other 
States 
The issue eventually came before the Court in Nevada v. 
Hall55 in the context of a car crash.  There, the Court considered 
whether Nevada could claim immunity from a California state-
court alleging damages caused by a Nevada bus in California.56  
The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment and the cases 
discussing inherent state sovereign immunity were concerned only 
with the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the level of 
comity to be granted to Nevada was purely a matter of California 
law.57 
 
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114–244) (endowing the Supreme Court with exclusive 
and original jurisdiction); see David Hatton & Jay Wexler, The First Ever 
(Maybe) Original Jurisdiction Standings, 1 J. OF LEGAL METRICS 19, 21–23 
(2012) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and providing the 
standings of how various states have done against each other; fans of the Big 
Ten will be pleased to learn that, according to the authors, Minnesota (5-0), 
Michigan (6-1), Ohio (4-1) and Wisconsin (5-2) top the standings.  Those who 
prefer the SEC might be disappointed by the fact the last two places are held 
by Louisiana (2-7), Arkansas (1-5) and Tennessee (0-5)).  
 53. 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).  
 54. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–24, 733 (1877). 
 55. See 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979).  
 56. Id. at 411, 414. 
 57. See id. at 420–21, 426–27. 
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3. The Arguably Anomalous Position of Hall 
Hall was decided well before Seminole Tribe and its numerous 
progeny explained that state sovereign immunity was part of the 
constitutional structure.58  In addition, after Seminole Tribe and 
Alden, it leads to an odd situation given Article III’s efforts to 
protect states and state interests from local prejudice by providing 
a federal forum.  The Eleventh Amendment, Seminole Tribe, and 
Alden mean that, although a state is not subject to suit in federal 
court or its own courts without its consent, it may be subject to 
suit, at least under state law, in the courts of another state.59  
Moreover, an action against a state in the courts of another state 
could not be removed, because, as a result of the Eleventh 
Amendment, such an action would not be one over which the 
district courts would have original jurisdiction.60 
4. Justice Scalia Exits—Hall Stays 
It was the anomalous position of Hall that led California to 
ask that it be overruled.  Seminole Tribe and its progeny have 
been supported by a constant five to four majority of the court, 
including Justice Kennedy.61  Indeed, there is reason to believe 
that soon Hall is headed for the scrap heap of judicial history.  
The case we concern ourselves with here was argued on December 
7, 2015 and would have gone into conference the following Friday, 
December 11th.  Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016.  The 
decision in Hyatt was handed down on April 19, 2016.  Writing for 
the Court, Justice Breyer explained that, because the Court was 
equally divided, the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court to 
follow Hall was affirmed.62  However, as Bloomberg BNA’s sharp-
eyed Nicholas Datlowe has reported, when the opinion was first 
released, Justice Breyer’s opinion was labeled with the header 
“Opinion of Justice Breyer.”63  The next day a corrected version 
 
 58. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999). 
 59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Alden, 527 U.S. at 712, 732–33 (1999); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64, 67–68 (1996). 
 60. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 61. E.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 745–
46 (2002); Alden, 527 U.S. at 706; Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 (2015). 
 62. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279 (2016).  
 63. Nicholas Datlowe, Minor Error, Major Effect, US LAW WEEK BLOG 
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.bna.com/minor-error-major-b57982070195/. 
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was issued with the Breyer’s opinion headed “Opinion of the 
Court.”64  As Datlowe explained, had Justice Breyer been assigned 
to write the majority, his opinion would have always been headed 
“Opinion of the Court.”65  Moreover, had the majority decided to 
overrule Hall, which is a good guess as to what would have 
happened had Justice Scalia lived to take part in the final decision 
of the case, there would have been no need for the “opinion of the 
court” to have reached the question of the extent to which Nevada 
was obligated to apply its own immunity law to California.66  The 
case would have simply been reversed and remanded with the 
instruction to dismiss the action.  Therefore, it is a good guess that 
Justice Breyer’s opinion was originally written not as a 
concurrence in part with the decision to reverse the judgment and 
remand the case back to Nevada, but a dissent from the part of 
the decision to overrule Hall.67 
In any case, Hall remains.  To the extent a plaintiff can gain 
personal jurisdiction over a state in the courts of another state, 
the defendant state is not constitutionally immune from the 
suit.68  Of course, the evenly split Court cannot last forever.  As 
such, either Hall or other aspects of the Court’s state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence will be up for consideration when Justice 
Scalia’s replacement is seated.  On the other hand, whatever 
happens to the composition of the Court, the law of state sovereign 
immunity will not change right away and state courts may 
continue to be faced with the issue of what law to apply when 
another state is sued. 
III. THE LAWS APPLIED TO SUITS AGAINST OTHER STATES:  A FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS 
A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Application of the 
Defendant State’s Law of Immunity to Out of State Agencies 
In its opinion in Hall, the Court not only allowed Nevada to 
be sued in the California state court, but also considered whether 
California courts had to apply Nevada’s limitation on damages to 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id.  
 68. See Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279–80 (2016).   
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state agencies, then set at $25,000.69  Nevada argued that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution70 required California 
to do so.71 
Most lawyers encounter the Full Faith and Credit Clause as 
first-year students in the context of judicial proceedings, and 
learn, if anything, that states are required to give the same effect 
to out of state judgments as the rendering state would.72  
However, the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to 
more than judgments.  As such, states are required to give full 
faith and credit to “the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other [s]tate.”73  In Hall, the Court rejected 
the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required California 
to apply Nevada’s limit on liability, concluding that, in contrast to 
giving effect to another state’s judgments, a state could take its 
own public policy into account.74 
On the first trip of the California Franchise Tax Board and 
Hyatt to the Supreme Court, California argued that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause required Nevada to apply California statutory 
law exempting the Franchise Tax Board from liability.75  
California lost. Citing Hall the Court explained that “[t]here is no 
principled distinction between Nevada’s interests in tort claims 
arising out of its university employee’s automobile accident, at 
issue in Hall, and California’s interests in the tort claims here 
arising out of its tax collection agency’s residency audit.”76  The 
Court concluded that Nevada was free to substitute its own public 
policy—that of compensating tort victims.77 
On his next trip to the Court, Hyatt’s winning streak stopped 
at one.  The Court concluded that while Nevada courts did not 
have to apply California’s statutory immunity to California and its 
agencies, it did have to apply Nevada’s own form of immunity, 
which limits recovery against the state and its agencies to 
$50,000.78 
 
 69. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416, 420–21 (1979). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 71. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421. 
 72. See id. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 74. Hall, 440 U.S. at 422–23.  
 75. See Hyatt I, 538 U.S. 488, 498 (2003). 
 76. Id.   
 77. Id. at 494. 
 78. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1283 (2015). 
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The Court explained that by failing to give California agencies 
the same level of immunity it would give to its own agencies, 
Nevada was showing a constitutionally impermissible “policy of  
hostility” toward other states.79  That is, it was okay for Nevada to 
say “our policy of compensating tort victims is more important 
than California’s policy of protecting its agencies from private 
suits,” but Nevada could not say “protecting Nevada agencies is 
more important than protecting California agencies.”  According to 
the Court, discriminating against California state agencies would 
be unfair, and therefore contrary to the demands of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.80 
B. Textualism and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts complained that while 
the majority’s resolution “seem[ed] fair,” the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not mention “fairness.”81  It has only to do with how 
states are to treat the public acts and records of other states.82  
Once the Court had concluded that a Nevada court could proceed 
to judgment against a California agency (as the Court concluded 
in Hall) and that Nevada did not have to apply California’s grant 
of immunity from suit to its agencies (as the Court concluded in 
Hyatt I), the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Nevada 
to do anything else in particular with application of its own law to 
California.83 
Of course, the Chief Justice was right; the text of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not say anything about fairness or 
any other standard beyond “full faith and credit.”  However, as the 
majority explained, since the Court has concluded that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not always require one state to 
apply the law of another state where a party for another state may 
be involved, the Court has developed a jurisprudence to determine 
what a court should do when faced with another party.84  In 
addition, there are many areas of constitutional law, notably the 
law of state sovereign immunity, that lack firm textual grounding. 
 
 79. Id. at 1281 (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 1281, 1283. 
 81. Id. at 1284 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1285–86. 
 83. Id. at 1286–87. 
 84. Id. at 1282–83 (majority opinion). 
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C. Hyatt as an Example of the Federal Common Law of 
Interstate Relations 
More importantly, the dissent and the majority’s response 
miss the point.  The requirements of “fairness” are not found in 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but rather in the constitutional 
requirement that the Supreme Court formulate a law of interstate 
relations.  The first clause of Article III, section 2, brings 
“[c]ontroversies between two or more [s]tates” within the federal 
judicial power,”85 and the second clause puts those controversies 
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.86  While it 
is arguable from the text of Article III that Congress can strip the 
Supreme Court of original jurisdiction in matters between 
states,87 Congress has put such suits within the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court since 1789.88 
In determining state against state actions, the Supreme Court 
has come up with a common law of interstate relations that mostly 
deals with the law of property boundaries. 89  This has been 
uncontroversial, as it would not make sense for the Court in 
adjudicating disputes between states to be bound by the law of one 
state or another.  Moreover, the formulation of a federal common 
law based on a jurisdictional grant is not unique to state against 
state controversies.  It is found in labor management relations90 
pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act’s grant of 
federal jurisdiction over labor management contracts;91 
international humanitarian law92 pursuant to the Alien Tort 
Statute’s grant of federal jurisdiction over “torts only in violation 
of the law of nations;”93 and maritime law94 pursuant to the 
 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 86. Id. § 2, cl. 2.   
 87. Id. It is at least arguable that the Exceptions and Regulation Clause 
in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, which allows Congress to regulate the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, applies only to the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Court. 
 88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244); Hatton 
& Wexler, supra note 52, at 20. 
 89. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998). 
 90. See, e.g., Textile Workers of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448, 456–57 (1957). 
 91. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 92. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694–95 (2004).  
 93. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). 
 94. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501–02 (2008). 
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Constitutional and statutory grant of jurisdiction over “cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”95  The law formulated by 
the Supreme Court in those cases is federal law, and, pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, it is binding on state and federal courts in 
any dispute in which it may apply.96  Thus, for example, to the 
extent it applies, the federal law of state boundaries will apply in 
a private action between two landholders in a private action 
concerning property rights.97  Therefore, to the extent that the 
application of a forum state’s law granting immunity to out-of-
state agencies involves an issue that could give rise to a state 
against state action, the law that would apply in that action is 
federal common law subject to formulation by the Supreme Court.  
Counsel for Hyatt recognized this possibility during oral 
argument: 
If . . . let’s assume, hypothetically, that . . . California 
brought an original action in this Court, and it said we 
want an injunction ordering . . . Nevada to apply its 
damages cap to all suits against California in Nevada 
courts . . . .  What would the basis in Federal law be for 
that lawsuit? . . .  [E]ven if the Court had the power, some 
Federal law, generally—maybe Federal common law, 
which is always something the Court, I guess, can create 
if necessary—why would they particularly choose this 
rule?98 
Of course, Hyatt argued that there was no need to formulate a 
federal common law of comity between states, especially one that 
would require Nevada to treat California agencies as Nevada 
would treat its own.99 
Once, however, one recognizes that the Court would have 
jurisdiction to determine the hypothetical action by California 
against Nevada, it is apparent that the Court has to come up with 
some rule of decision.  That rule might be “Nevada courts can 
treat California and its agencies as a private litigant,” or, “Nevada 
 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(1) (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 114–244).  
 96. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942). 
 97. See Potomac Shores, Inc. v. River Riders, Inc., 219 Md. App. 29 (Md. 
2013). 
 98. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 
(2015) (No. 14-1175).   
 99. Id. 
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courts have to treat California and it its agencies as it would treat 
Nevada and its agencies,” or, perhaps, some other rule.  
Nevertheless, there needs to be a basis for the decision.  Once it is 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court needs to formulate a basis 
for the decision in the hypothetical action brought by California, 
then “fairness” becomes a perfectly good basis for formulating a 
rule decision.  Of course, there may be other considerations, such 
as Nevada’s dignity as a sovereign state, in formulating a rule of 
decision. One can imagine the Court having decided this case the 
other way, but in that case the Court would have announced a 
rule of decision that state courts are free to treat other states and 
their agencies as private parties.  One would hope that the Court 
would have at least considered “fairness” in whatever rule of 
decision it formulated.  To claim that “fairness” has nothing to do 
with the Court’s decision is to ignore that the Supreme Court has 
an affirmative role in the formation of the law of interstate 
disputes, and federal common law in general. 
CONCLUSION 
After Hyatt, we know a couple of things.  States are still liable 
to be sued in the courts of other states, and, when a state is sued, 
the court hearing the action will have to treat the defendant state 
and its agencies as it would treat its own state and agencies.100 
This brief summary has brought into focus things that were 
true before Hyatt:  the Supreme Court is equally divided on, 
among other issues, state sovereign immunity. The law’s 
development in that area, as well as others, will depend on the 
next appointment to the Court, and the Supreme Court will 
continue to come up with rules of decisions that involve interstate 
disputes.  What role “fairness” will play in those rules remains to 
be seen. 
 
 100. See Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2015). 
